Abstract. This paper describes the evolution of pension and retirement income systems in the developed world from the late 19th century through to the early years of the 21st century. The analysis is broadly descriptive, emphasizing the arguments for and against different retirement income institutions and drawing, distinctions between developments in the Anglo-American world and continental Europe. The paper makes three arguments. First, demography looms large for all pension institutions, whether public or private. This was true in the late 19th century when the British government sought to estimate state pension costs and is especially important today as increased longevity may drastically discount promised retiree income. Second, the high rate of income replacement promised by continental European social security institutions may well give way to lower benefits, more consistent with AngloAmerican policies than the ideals underpinning European social solidarity. Third, 19th century idealism may well be replaced by the 21st century notion that individuals should be responsible to make-up for shortfalls in nation-state social security. In short the effects of globalisation on revenue-raising capacity and of demography on expenditure patterns will place enormous constraints on the ability of the nation-states to deliver on pension promises.
With the prompting of the World Bank (1994), Leibfritz et al. (1995) , and the OECD (1998, 2000) , policy analysts and the public at large have come to recognise that the ageing of the population raises difficult questions as to the funding of the generous pension benefits promised in the wake of the Second World War. Because of dramatic increases in longevity and declines in fertility, by 2050 the ratio of elderly to working age population will be at unprecedented levels (Standard & Poors 2004) . In many countries, this dramatic increase in the dependency ratio threatens the fiscal integrity not only of the pension system but perhaps even the solvency of nation-state (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000) .
The aging of the population and the pressure that it puts on the pension systems raises a host of issues spread across academic disciplines. In terms of comparative economics, countries vary significantly in terms of their ability to fund prospective entitlements. If the past is the future, in some countries that future could impoverish the young and the old. Not surprisingly, such differences between nation-states are grist for the academic mill (Boer et al. 2001 , Bonoli et al. 2001 ). Further, increasing economic integration may also limit the ability of nation-states to fulfil their pension promises. In terms of philosophy, the projected shortfall in funding raises important issues of social justice and intergenerational equity. In terms of political science, large numbers of older citizens will form a formidable political bloc. Pensioner poverty and the extent to which younger generations owe their parents and grandparents a living income will be on the political agenda in ways unimagined 25 years ago.
As policymakers and the public consider reform of their pension systems, it is important to remember that which was inherited from the past, including the bargains struck between social and political interests at the time of institutional innovation.
That is not to say the past is necessarily the future, despite the veritable scholastic industry demonstrating the inexorable power of path (Hall and Soskice 2001) . Indeed, the experience in different parts of the world shows the ability of institutions, regulatory regimes, and customs and conventions to change even if in the face of entrenched interests committed to preserving the past. Some of our own research has demonstrated the responsiveness of market actors to financial imperatives, such as the unanticipated adjustments of German corporations to global financial markets. Clark and Wojcik 2005) . Of course, a few assertions and citations hardly overturn the notion of path dependence but they do raise questions about claims of historical inevitability.
Just as inheritance from the past, globalisation is also a vital part of the pension story, even if public and private pension systems have been relatively insulated from the immediate effects of global competition. The intersection between demographic trends, domestic fiscal and financial systems, and global competition for the fruits of economic growth has not been adequately conceptualised. Many analysts write as if pension and retirement income systems are firmly ensconced behind the "high walls" of national borders. This perspective is not surprising, given that much of the literature comes from sociology and political science over the formation of the welfare state. Close scrutiny of nation-state pension systems themselves began in earnest only in the last twenty years, so few researchers have placed national systems in the global environment. This is part of our research agenda.
This chapter begins with the past-with the late 19th century British debate over the proper provision, nature of benefits, and funding of old-age pensions. This debate has been widely discussed elsewhere (see, for example, Thane 2000). Nevertheless, it provides two important points of reference that should inform academic research.
First, the size of the elderly population has changed dramatically. In the world's wealthiest economy at the turn of the 20th century those aged 65 years or older were only about five per cent of the population compared to about 18 per cent in 2000, and 37 per cent forecast for 2050. Second, the British debate is the first instances where the theories and methods of social science enquiry were put to use for policy purposes. The skills and experience of leading reformers, academics, and government officials informed the discussion about old-age pension provision. This chapter then works through issues related to the evolution of pension and retirement income provision over the 20th century. Finally, it reviews the components of the retirement income system, beginning with the PAYG social security (Pillar I), employersponsored supplementary schemes (Pillar II) and, finally, individual retirement products (Pillar III).
The great pensions debate
London in the 19th century was the dominant international financial centre. Then, as now, it attracted migrants from the rest of the UK, Europe, and the world. For all its imperial wealth, however, many residents were poor. According to Gareth Stedman Jones (1971) , the incidence of poverty was directly related to the competitive nature of the labour market. Recurrent waves of in-migration, highly variable rates of economic growth, and limited job tenure in the hundreds of thousands of small enterprises that dominated London all contributed to fierce competition for jobs. The scramble for a living preoccupied men, women, and children in ways consistent with the experience of residents in today's mega cities of the developing world.
Although social reformers were acutely aware of the cruel conditions in which many people lived, much of the debate about urban poverty was about individual virtue.
Commentators stressed the need to develop amongst the working classes the virtues of thrift, industriousness, and self-help. Few argued that the state had any responsibility for the welfare of those most at risk to the vicissitudes of market capitalism. The vulnerable elderly had few refuges from poverty. Most families could scarcely cope with their children's needs let alone the needs of their elderly relatives. Charities were thinly spread, and, at best, proffered only modest aid.
The 19th century debate in the UK over old-age poverty provides a crucial reference point for understanding the nature and scope of inherited institutions in the developed world (Sires 1954) . This debate was very much informed by the methods and techniques of analysis associated with the social sciences. Indeed, recent debate about the prospects for PAYG pension and retirement income institutions over the 21st century has grappled with the same issues then analysed in parliamentary hearings.
The analysis presented by the Parliamentary Select Committee on Age Deserving Poor in 1899 regarding the structure and long-term cost of an old-age PAYG pension scheme offers a wonderful example.
After an introduction devoted to previous reports disputing the need for an old-age pension scheme, the Committee argued that "cases are too often to be found in which poor and aged people, whose conduct and whose whole career has been blameless, industrious, and deserving, find themselves for no fault of their own, at the end of a long and meritorious life, with nothing but the workhouse or inadequate out-door relief, as a refuge for their declining years." A wide range of reformers, government officials, and experts submitted evidence on behalf of the "deserving poor." Experts offered empirical tests to discredit the idea that the aged were poor because of moral laxity. As well, the Committee drew upon the advice and evidence of Charles Booth and his extensive surveys of poverty in and around London. Members examined tables of data on the incidence of old-age poverty drawn from survey data to build a comprehensive picture of destitution. Finally, underpinning the whole enterprise was the advice of leading government actuaries and economists, including testimony on urban poverty by Professor Alfred Marshall from Cambridge University.
To provide a comparative reference point, and evidence that old-age pension schemes could be successfully introduced in ways consistent with British standards, the Committee reported upon evidence gleaned by a government official's visit to Denmark. (Danish pensions were viewed as more relevant than the German social insurance system because they were of similar value to those anticipated by the Committee.) The Committee evidenced considerable interest in indexing of Danish pension benefits to price changes in different types of communities differentiating, for example, between rural areas, small towns, and large cities (especially Copenhagen).
Members also scrutinized the administrative costs of the Danish pension system. . And most importantly, the Committee discussed the need to maintain incentives for individuals to save for their own future rather than relying entirely upon the pension institution.
With evidence on the incidence and causes of poverty and the template for a system consistent with British interests, the Committee argued that to do nothing about oldage poverty would intensify cruelty and great suffering.
The Committee recommended the establishment of a national scheme where eligibility for a pension would be based on seven conditions. These included 1. being a British subject, 2.
being 65 years of age or over, 3. having not been convicted and imprisoned for an offence over the past 20 years, 4. having not received poor relief over the past 20 years except for exceptional reasons, 5. with proof of residence in a district, 6. being not in receipt of an income from any source more than 10 shillings a week, and 7.
with proof to the effect that they had made provision for themselves and immediate dependents to their best to ability with "reasonable providence" and thrift. This proposal was not enacted, but was clearly important in framing the 1908 Act.
The Committee sought to determine the likely current and future cost of its proposal to the Exchequer. To determine how many people were 65 years of age or older, they The second issue raised by the 19 th century debate was the relationship between employers and employees (in modern parlance). The 19th century reformers grappling with the consequences of urban and industrial capitalism were forced to acknowledge that the paternal concern of owners for the well-being of their workers could not be relied upon as it had been for so many past centuries. Furthermore, those giving evidence to parliamentary enquiries recounted time and again the inadequacies of the existing welfare system based, as it was, on institutions derived from the agrarian revolution rather than the industrial revolution.
Finally, the debate about pension need and entitlement was also a debate about the past, present, and future social and economic organisation of welfare. The idea that the nation-state was to stand in place of paternal relationships, local systems of welfare, and charitable organisations represented a remarkable moment in the consolidation of the power of the nation-state (Bayly 2004) . It also reflected a realisation that the elderly deserved the protection of the nation-state. This is not to say that the nation-state wholly replaced past institutions and forms of pension welfare. In the Anglo-American world, at least, employer-sponsored pension systems In the aftermath of the Great Depression and the Second World War, pension reform was an important component in the creation of welfare states across the world. The shape and structure of each welfare state owed much to national political and social coalitions rather. Although the UK looked to Denmark in its 19th century debate over social security, nation-specific compromises determined the structure of each country's system. Indeed, more often than not, nation-state welfare institutions were designed to "regulate" the relationships between social classes in the context of their experience of the 1930s and the post-war settlement of the mid 1940s. In many countries, the population had a sense of obligation to the elderly who had endured the privations of the Great Depression and had survived the war. Furthermore, since official population forecasts replayed earlier assumptions that nation-state populations would be stable or even declining over the coming decades; the costing and design of nation-state welfare systems paid little heed to the emerging baby boom generation.
It is important to emphasize that nation-state welfare systems were often-times comprehensive sets of overlapping entitlements conceived for social and political purposes more so than for their economic consequences. These systems accommodated unemployment and under-employment without regard to the longterm financial viability of each system of entitlement. Being pay-as-you-go and dependent upon the flow of nation-state tax revenue, the value of welfare state benefits was more a question of income distribution than it was an issue of fiscal Not realizing the full long-term costs of population aging, the first steps taken to reform PAYG pensions systems tended to be modest. Governments have reduced benefits, in many cases, by a combination of increasing the years required to obtain maximum amount and switching from wage to price indexation after retirement.
Some reforms have tightened the link between contributions and benefits and capped benefits for higher income groups. Other have dampened incentives for early retirement and put in place incentives to encourage continued employment. Finally, some countries have considered some forward funding, albeit at modest levels, of long-term retirement income obligations. Even these modest reforms have been widely contested, precipitating political upheaval in the largest European economies.
Major structural reform, such as that undertaken in Australia and Sweden, has been the widely studied but rarely incorporated into pension reform movements ( Generally speaking, employer-sponsored and occupational pensions began in government, manufacturing corporations, and craft industries before spreading somewhat unevenly elsewhere. Distilling the historical record, three forces have fostered the provision of such schemes. First, employers wanted to maintain the loyalty of valued employees who has job-specific skills and expertise. In effect, employers sum-up the labour productivity benefits of extended job tenure against the costs of providing retirement income (Lazear 1995) . Furthermore, assuming that retirement income is a form of deferred wage, both employers and employees may have a common interest in distributing earned income over a person's expected lifetime.
Second, employer-sponsored pension plans were intimately connected with labourmanagement relationships. In many countries, employer-sponsored pension plans were introduced through the collective bargaining process, and labour contracts regulated the value of benefits, contribution rates, and grievance procedures over benefit eligibility (Ghilarducci 1992) . For many years the extent to which employers offered such plans was a function of their industry affiliation, the density of union representation, and the spill-over effects of collective bargaining within and between industries. These private arrangements, typically in the form of defined benefit plans, were formalised into legislation and regulation after the Second World War, reflecting the public interest in regulating these institutions and extending private pension coverage to other industries. In some countries, governments required employers to offer retirement benefits, effectively bypassing the need for union representation and even the collective bargaining process.
Finally, once employer-sponsored pension plans became matters of public policy, governments sought to ensure that employers' interests were regulated by broader commitments to the equitable treatment of different classes of workers. Government had a stake in these plans because it provided favourable tax benefits on employer and employee contributions. Furthermore, as supplementary pension benefits became more important in terms of their contribution to retirement income, governments sought to indemnify workers (as plan participants) against the risk that promised pension benefits would not materialise because of the financial circumstances and status of the sponsoring organisation. This was important in Anglo-American countries where PAYG pension benefits have been modest (Clark 1993 ).
Employer-sponsored defined benefit plans were well suited to an environment in which large manufacturing firms dominated their domestic markets and were able to insulate workers and retirees from the vicissitudes of market competition by virtue of their oligopolistic status. In some cases, firms and whole industries used their defined benefit pension plans to retire employees in the face of increasing competition. These declining firms and industries ultimately faced enormous financing problems as the number of retirees exploded and the number of workers declined sharply. The run-up in financial markets over the 1990s masked the full extent of these problems, as "contribution holidays" (Blake 2003).
The changing industrial structure, costly regulation, and employers' increasing unwillingness to accept financial risk led to a dramatic change in the nature of pension coverage at the end of the 20 th century. Defined benefit plans were replaced by defined contribution arrangements, which seemed more tangible to an increasingly well educated and mobile work force. As with defined benefit plans, the financial services industry has grown to accommodate these pension and retirement income institutions, and the expansion of this industry makes Anglo-American economies very different from continental European economies (Blackburn 2002; Hawley and Williams 2000) . Some analysts claim this is a vital clue to the differential performance of these economies over the latter half of the 20th century (Clark 2003) .
Over the coming decades, only the public sector may continue to provide defined benefit plans -something that may give rise to significant political tensions by those not so privileged. Even so, looking forward to a world of increasingly limited labour resources, especially in the OECD economies, it is possible to imagine the partial return of hybrid defined benefit plans in the private sector. The labour shortages will be increasingly common in the wealthiest economies; lower fertility and lower rates of immigration may together add a premium on the value of younger generations (Scheiber 2005). Hybrid defined benefit schemes could be important for retaining valued employees, not withstanding the costs of such schemes (Cahill and Soto 2003) .
Whether new types of defined benefit institutions can be (re-)created given the changing fortunes of private employers in the global economy remains to be seen.
Retirement income as a financial product
Many individuals are increasingly reliant upon markets rather than employers for supplementary pension and retirement income. In part, this is a defensive strategy by those seeking to insulate themselves from the risks of poor and inadequate pension income from institutions they no longer entirely trust. Investment in housing and other similarly long-lived assets, apparent among the middle classes in many developed economies, may reflect a lack of confidence in the pension promises of PAYG and employer-sponsored institutions. Similarly, in some instances those reliant upon these institutions opt out so as to reduce the risks of institutional failure. In the UK, of course, this was actively encouraged by previous governments allowing individuals to opt-out of employer-sponsored supplementary pension schemes in favour of the private market for individual pensions. This strategy proved more expensive and carried higher risks than remaining with employer-sponsored pension plans.
In some countries, the retail market for investment products such as mutual funds and unit trusts has been an alternative source of savings for pension and retirement income. Granted, this is not as popular as sometimes implied by the financial press but these products play some role in North America and in some countries of continental Europe such as France where employer-sponsored institutions are largely absent for many of the middle-class in private employment. During the 1990s this strategy was strongly advocated in the UK by the financial industry seeking to encourage middle-class investors to bypass social-security and insurance markets.
Relying on private products creates some moral hazard in that should this strategy fail, state-sponsored social security would become the backup source of pension and retirement income. Consider the purchase of an annuity This product, which is generally offered by a life insurance company, pays monthly amounts for as long as an individual lives in exchange for an initial upfront premium. Obviously, the best time to purchase an annuity is when bond rates are relatively high So that the price of the annuity is relatively low. This can be quite problematic. Few people may have the option to choose when to purchase an annuity. In any event, it is difficult to time the market.
In addition, as recent UK experience shows, the purchase of an annuity must take into account the long-term solvency of the company offering the income contract. This is hardly an easy task for professional investment analysts let alone the average person.
And yet, these are precisely the kinds of calculations that must be made when assessing the purchase of annuities.
The market provision of pension and retirement income depends, in part, on the rationality, knowledge, and decision-making capacities of consumers. But such an assumption is rarely justified by empirical research about actual behaviour in psychology and the decision sciences. (see Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Thaler 1993) . Many people use heuristics and short-cuts in their decision-making, thereby economising on the use of time and resources rather than expending enormous effort on large and small issues (Gigerenzer and Todd (1999) . Moreover, most people are not concerned with achieving optimal outcomes but are more often satisfied with approximates to the best outcome (if that can be known) (see Bröder 2003).
Consequently, any appeal to "informed" consumers of pension and retirement income products must come to terms with the fact that they operate in a world of systematic information and knowledge asymmetries.
One of the virtues of PAYG social security has been its role for standard-setting with respect to the contributions necessary to ensure the minimum (in some countries) and the desired rate of income replacement. Similarly, one of the virtues of defined benefit pension plans has been the collective albeit decentralized process of setting benefit levels across different types of employees and different incomes. In many cases, social justice (Pillar I) and equitable treatment (Pillar II) have together set a rate of income replacement far higher than that available through the purchase of pension and retirement products (Pillar III). The evidence suggests that left to themselves, individuals save less than they should for retirement either because they over-value current income or because their earnings are so low that they rightly discount the value of accumulated assets against the costs of appropriate retirement income products, or because they have no access to such saving opportunities (Munnell and Sundén 2003) .
The implications of these observations are far-reaching. First, the nation-state may have to set mandatory contribution rates while providing access to retirement income products at a reasonable cost. Second, the nation-state may have to provide incomerelated incentives to encourage the working poor to contribute to their future income,
given the prospect of increasing income inequality between social classes. Third, the regulation of the financial services industry with respect to both the cost-efficiency of services and access to its products at an effective price may be necessary ingredients in any comprehensive policy aimed at ensuring all people have an adequate retirement income. Otherwise, 19th century idealism about the "thriftiness" of individuals may re-appear in the guise of 21st idealism regarding the competence and rationality of individuals in the market for financial services.
Conclusions
The most compelling argument in favour of state responsibility for elderly welfare came from those who were able to show that many of the elderly were poor for no fault (moral or otherwise) of their own. Even if debate focused upon the costs of demography, the rules of entitlement, and learning from other jurisdictions it was a debate that sought to reject 19th century idealism in favour of dealing with the reality of pensioner poverty. It is remarkable that the debate about pension provision in OECD countries has shifted back to some measure of individual responsibility. While no doubt qualified, of course, by national sentiments and values regarding social solidarity and individual autonomy, 21st century idealism lauds the competence of individuals in financial markets. Governments of all political persuasions have encouraged individuals to plan for the future, sitting responsibility with them for more-than-need pension and retirement income aspirations.
Looking forward, the cost of pensions will be dwarfed by rapidly rising healthcare costs. Here, these two programs will challenge the fiscal capacity of nation-states.
Many countries' government budgets will reflect incremental political responses to the demand by an aging society. Many countries, whether those dominated by the private provision or the public provision of health care, will face difficult choices between further expenditure on pensions and health care, on the one hand, versus education, or even defence on the other. The available tax revenue is a function of economic growth. In addition, any country's tax burden is "regulated" by global capital flows and the relative tax burden of other countries. Reconciliation of these issues with the provision of pension and retirement income will depend upon the respective responsibilities of public and private institutions for elderly benefits and income.
This is much the same issue posed in the late 19th century in British Parliament, and was at the heart of 20th century debate over the role of the state in capitalist and noncapitalist societies. After the Second World War, the consensus was that the government would play an important role in all areas of social life including the provision of social security. This consensus, which was driven by the experience of the Great Depression and then the Cold War, appears to be crumbling in the early 21st century. At the same time, it remains unclear how nation-states should provide incentives for middle and upper class taxpayers to provide for themselves in retirement and how income should be distributed in the future between the generations and within the generations. The Great Depression and the Cold War seem too distant in time to be the litmus tests of institutional design and political coalitions.
